Nebraska Law Review
Volume 42 | Issue 4

1963

Laws Affecting Public Power Districts
Ralph O. Canaday
Attorney, Hastings, Nebraska

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
Recommended Citation
Ralph O. Canaday, Laws Affecting Public Power Districts, 42 Neb. L. Rev. 777 (1963)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol42/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Article 4

LAWS AFFECTING PUBLIC POWER DISTRICTS
Ralph 0. Canaday*
I. INTRODUCTION
Senate File 310 of the 1933 Legislature, the Enabling Act providing for the creation of public power and irrigation districts, has
now been the law of this state for thirty years.
At the time of its passage, the state was not only in the midst
of the great depression, but the devastating drouth of the early 30's
with its dust storms and its crop failures was also upon the people.
Only those who lived through those terrible years, and saw and felt
the desperation and fear that seized the farm population and those
dependent upon the farmers for their survival, can even imagine
the suffering and hardship that this country experienced. It was
against this background that the 1933 Legislature met, and it was
out of these conditions that this Enabling Act was born.
Senate File 310 was thought of as being primarily an aid to
irrigation development. The chapter of the Act, as it appears in
the 1933 Session Laws, is "Irrigation", and the title begins by
stating that it is "An Act relating to irrigation, flood control,
" Then follows the
storage of waters of natural streams ....
reference to electrical power facilities.
The importance of the emphasis on irrigation at the time the
Enabling Act was passed has been justified. The Central Nebraska
Public Power and Irrigation District (which irrigates about 120,000
acres of land from its own system and supplies supplemental storage
water from its reservoirs for approximately that much additional
land) and other irrigation projects were made possible by this
Act. It is estimated that Kingsley Dam and other hydraulic facilities construed by the Central Nebraska Public Power and
Irrigation District alone have increased the farm income in this
state by $15,000,000 annually. If this estimate is substantially
correct, the income taxes resulting from this increased income over
the past twenty years have repaid the federal government all the
money advanced for this project's construction.
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The most remarkable change in the industrial and domestic life
of Nebraska during the past thirty years has been the increased
use of electricity. Thirty years ago the entire state used about 500
million kilowatt hours of energy annually. This is to be contrasted
with 1962 when Nebraska used approximately four billion kilowatt
hours of electrical energy, or about eight times the amount used
when the Enabling Act was passed.
In 1933, the amount of rural electrification was negligible. In
1962, rural public power districts and cooperative corporations
supplied about 700 million kilowatt hours of electrical energy to the
farm homes in this state, or more than the whole state used thirty
years ago.
In 1933 there were no large generating plants outside of Omaha.
Industry using large quantities of energy was practically confined
to the Omaha area. But during this period public power districts
have constructed a number of large power plants in Nebraska and
have built a high voltage transmission grid system that carries
power produced by these plants to the greater part of the state.
This grid system of transmission is capable of delivering electric
power and energy to the cities and towns throughout the eastern
two-thirds of Nebraska, thus providing industry located therein
with power at low rates, high voltages, and in sufficient quantities.
Not all of this progress can be credited to development brought
about by the passage of the Enabling Act, but a very substantial
part of it has resulted from this statute.
II. NATURE OF PUBLIC POWER AND IRRIGATION DISTRICTS
The Enabling Act' defines a public power district, or a public
power and irrigation district, as "a public corporation and political
subdivision of the state." The characteristics of such an organization
are well established by the decisions of our courts. It must be
created pursuant to an act of the legislature as an agency of the
state to promote the public welfare. Its property is public property
held by it in trust for the benefit of the people of the state. Its
officers are officers and agents of the state. Both its property and
its officers are at all times under the plenary control of the state
legislature.

I NEB.

REV. STAT. §

70-602 (Reissue 1958).
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The-Supreme Court of Nebraska, in United Community Serv-

ices v. Omaha Nat'l Bank,2 said:
In regard thereto we have said that: "... a public corporation,
authorized by the legislature and organized pursuant thereto to
carry out functions that have been determined to be for a public
purpose and the general welfare of the people, is an arm or branch
of the government for this purpose and under the plenary control
of the legislature and therefore a governmental subdivision of the
state within the terms of section 2, art. VIII of the Constitution,
as amended in 1920."

Later on in the same opinion the court said: 3
As between the district and the state we have, as early as

Regents of University v. McConnell . . . said: "Hence it is very
clear that the rights and franchises of such public corporation
never become vested rights as against the state, and its charter
constitutes no contract in the sense of the constitutional provision
which prohibits the obligation of contracts being violated."
The court was just as emphatic in State ex rel. Johnson v. Consumers Public Power Dist.,4 where it held the district, as a public

corporation created by the legislature, subject to all restrictions
then or thereafter imposed, irrespective of provisions in the public
power district act and petition for the district's creation.5
United Community Services, supra, illustrates how strictly the

Supreme Court interprets the law defining the powers and duties
of the officers of public corporations. They will not be permitted
to expend the corporation's money for the public welfare unless
it be for the particular public welfare for which the corporation is
organized.
The ownership of its property by the state and the plenary
control of the legislature over its affairs are not the only characteristics of a public corporation. Another prerequisite (likewise
applicable to any body which levies taxes or expends public funds)
is that it be organized for a public purpose -a purpose which the
State itself can pursue.
The Nebraska Supreme Court defines "public corporations"
as follows: 6 "Public corporations are all those created specifically
for public purposes as instruments or agencies to increase the effi2162 Neb. 786, 793, 77 N.W.2d 576, 583 (1956). (Emphasis added.)
3Id.at 799, 77 N.W.2d at 586. (Emphasis added.)
4 143 Neb. 753, 10 N.W.2d 784 (1943).
5Id. at 769, 10 N.W.2d at 795.
6
Bliss v. Pathfinder Irrigation Dist., 122 Neb. 203, 240 N.W. 291 (1932);
accord, Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896); Lincoln
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ciency of government, supply public wants, and promote the public
welfare."
In 1877, the legislature authorized the creation of corporations
to drain wet land for the benefit of private individuals. The statute
granted these corporations the right of eminent domain. In passing
7
on the constitutionality of this statute, the supreme court said:
This is an infringement of the right of private property,
and is unauthorized and void. Even the board of county commissioners have no authority to authorize the location or construction
of drains except where they "will be conducive to the public
health, convenience, or welfare."
The Dartmouth College case8 is the most famous decision involving what is and what is not a public corporation. Chief Justice
John Marshall's opinion contains a very interesting discussion of
this subject. In 1754, Reverend Eleazar Wheelock started a school
for Indian youth which he financed with his private funds and
funds solicited from others. In 1755, King George III granted a
charter to the trustees of the school and named it Dartmouth
College. Through the years the college was maintained and expanded by private donations. In 1826, assuming that the college
was a public corporation because of its nature and functions, the
New Hampshire legislature attempted to assume control over it.
Justice Marshall admitted that the functions performed by the
college were of a public nature, and that they could properly be
performed by an agency of the state, but such did not overshadow
the fact that Dartmouth College was built with private funds,
was a private corporation, and that its charter granted by the
King was a contract binding on the state and protected by the
federal constitution.
Our public power and irrigation districts have the one qualification that Dartmouth College lacked in order to make it a state
agency and amenable to the legislature. Their property belongs
to the public, and they are financed by public funds.
III. CHARTERS OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
Perhaps in the foregoing discussion of the nature of public
power districts, more emphasis than was necessary was placed on
& Dawson County Irrigation Dist. v. McNeal, 60 Neb. 613, 83 N.W. 847
(1900); Board of Directors v. Collins, 46 Neb. 411, 64 N.W. 1086 (1895).
7 Jenel v. Green Island Drain Co., 12 Neb. 163, 10 N.W. 547 (1881).
s Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819).
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authority of the legislature over them. There has, however, been
a tendency among some lawyers, the legislature, and even the courts
to apply rules that apply only to private corporations. This is
illustrated by the way the term "charter" has come into use in
referring to the petition for the creation of a district filed with the
Department of Public Works.
The Dartmouth College case has been referred to as follows: 9
In the celebrated Dartmouth College case, decided by the
United States supreme court in 1819, the rule was established that
a charter granted by a state to a private corporation constitutes a
contract between the state and the incorporators within the protection of the contract clause of the federal Constitution, and the
rule thus established has, notwithstanding vigorous opposition and
criticism, met with universal recognition and enforcement by the
federal and state courts in cases arising under the contract clause
of the federal Constitution and similar clauses in state constitutions,
whether the corporation was state or under a charter granted by
special act of the legislature of a state.
Compare this statement with that of the Nebraska Supreme
Court in Board of Directors v. Collins,10 and it becomes apparent
that irrigation districts, public power and irrigation districts, and
public corporations generally have no charters in the sense in
which the term is used relative to private corporations. Referring
to irrigation districts the court, in Collins, said that they are
"'without any powers except such as the legislature may confer
upon them, and are at all times subject to a revocation of such
power .. . ."

Note also United Community Services v. Omaha

National Bank12 where the court said that a public power district's
"'charter constitutes no contract in the sense of the constitutional
provision which prohibits the obligation of contracts being violated:' ,,13
Also in the Johnson case, it was held that a public power
district is subject to all restrictions constitutionally imposed upon
it, irrespective of provisions in the public power district act; and
in a petition thereunder for the district's creation that district will
be subject to such act and amendments thereto.14
If a person were investigating the powers of a private corporation, he would look to its charter for his answer. Laws enacted
916 C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw 1351 (1956).

Neb. 411, 64 N.W. 1086 (1895).
1Id.at 419, 64 N.W. at 1088.
12 162 Neb. 786, 77 N.W.2d 576 (1956).
'3 Id. at 799, 77 N.W.2d at 586.
14 State ex rel. Johnson v. Consumers Public Power Dist., 143 Neb. 753,
10 N.W.2d 784 (headnote) (1943).

10 46
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subsequent to its incorporation would be ineffective to change a
private corporation's powers or affect its legal existence. If he were
investigating the powers of a public power district, he would look
to the statutes which always take precedence over any provisions
contained in the petition for its organization.
The term "charter" in legal literature has a number of meanings and is applied to a number of situations. There is no use of
the term more meaningless than its application to petitions for the
organization of public power districts.
The best illustration of this is the statute under which the
present Consumers Public Power District was organized. This
district originally included only the city of Columbus within its
boundaries, and its directors were all elected from that city. After
it received its "charter"; that is, after the petition for its organization was approved, it began to purchase the properties of private
power companies all over Nebraska. Within a few years it owned
all of such private companies' properties except those of the Nebraska Power Company in Omaha.
In 1943, the legislature decided that a public power district
serving such a large area should be managed by a board of directors
elected from the entire area which it served. To accomplish this
it enacted Chapter 145 of the Laws of Nebraska, 1943. This act provided: 15
Whenever the State Engineer shall determine, after investigation and hearing, of which ten days' notice shall be given to the
district by registered mail, that any district operates or is interested
by ownership, lease or otherwise in the operation of electric power
plants, distribution systems or transmission lines in more than fifty
counties in the state, he shall be authorized to enter an order
directing that further operation of the district shall be conditioned
upon the amendment by the district of the petition for its creation
to provide for a board of directors consisting of seven members,
to be reduced or increased to that number and to be elected in the
manner provided by section 70-704, C.S. Supp., 1941, as amended by
this act. Failure to file such amendment, within thirty days after
receipt of a notice to do so sent by the State Engineer, shall constitute a forfeiture by the district of all right to transact further
business in this state and it shall be the duty of the Attorney General to forthwith institute suit, in the district court of the county
where the principal place of business of the district is located, to
liquidate its assets and wind up its affairs through a receiver appointed by the court.

15Neb. Laws c. 145, p. 510 (1943), now NEB. REV. STAT. § 70-609.01 (Reissue 1958).
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This reorganization act required the directors of the district
to amend the original petition by approving the change in the
number of members of the board as demanded by the legislature.
The area within the district, as set forth in the original petition,
was changed by the legislature from the city of Columbus to an
area of eighty counties which, in turn, was divided into seven
election divisions, with one director to be elected from each division. The names of the counties comprising the new district,
and the counties in the election districts were all enumerated in
the act itself without any amendment of the petition. The act
also provided a different method for determining the eligibility of
electors who could vote for directors. These matters, although
they were changed in the provisions of the original "charter," were
altered by the legislature without requiring the old board to take
any action with reference thereto.
What was the logic that induced the legislature, after fixing
the number of directors that the reorganized district should have,
to compel the old board of directors to ratify the legislature's
action, but required no such action by the board relative to the
other changes? The coercion used by the legislature to compel the
board of directors to ratify the changes in its membership was
rather drastic.
If the legislature had sufficient control over the original Consumers District to make the changes just described without the
board of directors' approval, or if it had the power to carry out
its threat to abolish the district if the directors did not do as directed, then it certainly had the power to change the number of
directors without any assistance from the old board.
The legislature cannot do indirectly that which it cannot do
directly. The reverse of this is also true. If the legislature had no
power to change the number of directors to seven without action
by the old board, it could not validly coerce the board to take this
action. This is not saying that the action of the legislature was
ineffective to accomplish its purpose. It was just useless. So in
following the legislative mandate, the directors were not using their
discretion as officers and agents of the state, but were merely performing a clerical task that was required of them. Their action was
that of the legislature. It was not their own.
There may be other legal questions involving this act, such as
its constitutionality. A discussion of them is not within the scope
of this paper. The purpose of this discussion of the Consumers
Public Power District act is to illustrate the great length that the
legislature has gone in the exercise of its plenary control over these

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 42, NO. 4
districts and to show how unnecessary, inconsistent and confusing
one gets when going around Robin Hood's barn in following the
"charter" route to make desired changes in the districts when the
legislature, under the absolute control that the supreme court says
it has over these districts, could do the job simply and directly.
This district law, amended as it has been by almost every
legislature since its enactment, is becoming too complicated, with
(1) its different classifications of districts, providing certain functions that some districts can perform and others cannot, and
(2) its varying methods for choosing directors. These and other
differences make the law confusing-so confusing that a board of
directors needs an expert lawyer every time business is transacted.
Let us help at least a little, in the simplification of the law,
by eliminating this useless procedure of amending a charter that
really does not exist. If these districts have a charter, it is the
law under which they were organized and which they are required
to obey regardless of any provisions in the petitions of their
creation. These petitions have only one function; that is to help
make a legal entity out of the proposed district. When that is done,
the petition's job is done.
IV. TAXATION
One of the perennial controversies that the public power
districts face, not only in this state but all over the nation, is the
matter of exemption from taxation. The controversy has had an
interesting history in this state. It has been before the supreme
court, and was the subject of a constitutional amendment adopted
in 1958. Still it continues.
The controversy first became acute during the 1939 legislative
session. The large districts-The Central Nebraska Public Power
and Irrigation District, the Platte Valley Public Power and Irrigation District, and the Loup River Public Power District-having
constructed hydroelectric plants and systems, had spent almost all
of 1938 negotiating with power companies and investment bankers
for the purchases of most of the electric properties of the private
power companies operating in the state. The negotiations were
nearly completed when the legislature met in January, 1939. A
storm of protest against this purchase broke forth. The municipalities seemed suddenly to realize that the property of these districts
might turn out to be tax exempt. As a consequence, if the private
companies' properties were acquired by the districts, the municipalities would lose considerable tax revenue. Because of this
controversy the investment bankers who were to finance the pur-
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chases suddenly lost interest. Without financing, the deals fell
through.
The districts then began negotiations with the officials and
attorney of the League of Nebraska Municipalities to find a solution
that would eliminate the objections that the municipalities had to
the acquisition of these properties. The result of these negotiations
was a compromise. It was agreed that if private power company
properties were acquired by the districts, the districts would continue to pay in lieu of taxes the same amounts each year as the
power company paid in taxes prior to the year the districts acquired
them. This compromise was agreeable to the legislature and was
enacted into law.16
The next event, chronologically, was the decision of the supreme court holding that the Platte Valley Public Power and Irrigation District was a governmental subdivision of the state and its
property was exempt from taxation. 17 The specific question involved was whether or not the personal property of the district was
exempt from taxation under article VIII, section 2 of the constitution which provided that "The property of the State and its governmental subdivisions shall be exempt from taxation."
The court was unanimous in holding that this particular district
was a "governmental subdivision" and that its property was exempt.
The members of the court were not, however, unanimous in the
reasons they gave for their support of this decision or the extent
to which they thought it should be applied. The question which
divided them was the meaning of the term "governmental subdivision." There seemed to be unanimity on the proposition that
the constitutional provision would apply to the property of public
corporations and political subdivisions which performed "governmental functions," but would not apply to the property of public
corporations which performed only proprietary functions.
The judges agreed that because of the constitutional provisions 8
dedicating the water in the natural streams of the state to the people,

16 Neb. Laws c. 88, p. 381 (1939).
17 PlatteValley Public Power & Irrigation Dist. v. County of Lincoln, 144
Neb. 584, 14 N.W.2d 202 (1944).
18 Neb. Const. art. XV, §§ 4, 5, 6, 7.
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declaring that the necessity of water in such streams for domestic
use and irrigation was a natural want, and declaring that the use
of such water for power purposes was a public use that could not
be alienated, the development of the use of such water was a governmental function.
Two judges wrote concurring opinions. They based their concurrence on the proposition that the property of the districts was
exempt solely on the ground that the district was performing a
governmental function in developing a part of the state's water
resources in accordance with the provisions of the constitution.
These judges both indicated that they hoped the majority opinion
would be so interpreted. In fact, the majority may have meant
just that. The opinion concludes: 19
When the state, through its legislature, provides by statutory
enactment the manner in which districts, such as the appellant,
may be organized and operated for the purpose of using the waters
of our natural streams for irrigation and the development of power

for public use and such district is formed and part of the state's
waters dedicated to its use for such public purposes, then the district is in fact a governmental subdivision under our Constitution.
This then left two tax questions unsettled. First, was the law
providing for payment in lieu of taxes constitutional? Second, was
the property of districts which did not engage in developing the
state's water resources exempt from taxation?
To settle these questions some of the public power districts
promoted an amendment to the constitution and were successful
20
in having it adopted in 1958. This amendment reads as follows:

The payments in lieu of tax as made in 1957, together with any
payments made as authorized in this section shall be in lieu of

all other taxes, payments in lieu of taxes, franchise payments,

occupation and excise taxes, but shall not be in lieu of motor
vehicle licenses and wheel taxes, permit fees, gasoline tax and other
such excise taxes or general sales taxes levied against the public
generally.

This amendment not only answered the two questions propounded above, but it also levied a small tax on certain revenues
of some districts which had not previously been required. It did
even more than that. Prior to the adoption of this amendment, the

19 Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation Dist. v. County of Lincoln, 144
Neb. 584, 592, 14 N.W.2d 202, 206 (1944).

20 Neb.

Const. art. VIII, § 11.
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only tax exemption the districts enjoyed under the constitution was
the exemption from property taxes. The legislature's power to levy
income taxes, excise taxes, sales taxes, or any other kinds of taxes
it saw fit to levy was not restricted. Now these districts are exempt
from such taxes.
Our Supreme Court had said: 21 'We do not think that any form
of exemption either in the assessment and levy of taxes or from the
sale of property for their payment can be sustained unless constitutional or statutory provisions clearly so provide."
In an earlier case, where a county claimed exemption from
gasoline tax on22the ground that it was a governmental subdivision,
the court said:

In this state we are more specifically committed to the view

that "the taxing power vested in the legislature is without limit,
except such as may be prescribed by the constitution itself."
And the proper construction of these constitutional limitations
necessarily requires the due application of the principle that
limitations or restrictions upon the exercise of this essential power
of sovereignty can never be raised by implication, but the intention
to impose them must be expressed in clear, unambiguous language.
The conclusion is that the language employed in the provisions
of our state Constitution, on which the defendant relies, should
be given a fair, reasonable interpretation to ascertain the true
intent as to their scope, and then should be strictly applied and
enforced so that the limits they define shall not be unduly enlarged
or extended. The inhibition of section 2, art. 8 of the Constitution
as quoted, is limited to "the property of the state and its governmental subdivisions." This court is committed to the view that our
"state gasoline tax" here involved is an excise tax and not a
property tax.

It is hoped that now taxation of the public power districts is at
least one problem which is without the realm of controversy.
V. CONCLUSION
This discussion does not purport to be exhaustive or erudite.

Some of the matters discussed are still controversial. If any of the
discussion is thought provoking, it will have accomplished its
purpose.

21 Ryder v. Livingston, 145 Neb. 862, 18 N.W.2d 507 (1945).
22 State

v. Cheyenne County, 127 Neb. 619, 256 N.W. 67 (1934).

